Plato → Kant → Hegel → Schopenhauer

1. Plato’s dialectic as an ascent to the Forms In the Phaedrus Socrates praises the “dialecticians” who, by “division into species” and by grasping “a One and Many,” seek the underlying idea that unifies scattered particulars. This method of systematic division and synthesis is the Platonic prototype of a rational ascent from opinion to the immutable Forms.
2. Kant’s dialectic as the source of antinomies Kant reserves the term “dialectic” for the illusory use of pure reason when it tries to apply the formal rules of logic beyond possible experience. In the Critique of Pure Reason he warns that the “general logic… is called dialectic” and that it “must always be a logic of illusion… it gives the appearance of truth while remaining indifferent to objects.” This misuse generates the classic antinomies (contradictory conclusions about the unconditioned, the soul, the world‑totality).
3. Hegel’s absolute dialectic Hegel overturns Kant’s negative assessment. In The Logic he argues that “the study of truth… examines the forms of thought touching their capability to hold truth” and that “the form of thought is the perfect form, and that it presents the truth as it intrinsically and actually is.” For Hegel the dialectical movement is the self‑determining logical structure that generates and transcends each determinate form, culminating in the self‑developing Absolute.
4. Schopenhauer’s (missing) assignment of a role to dialectic The passages in the working memory that concern Schopenhauer focus on his doctrine of “forms of the Idea” and the will as thing‑in‑itself, but none discuss his view of the dialectical method. Consequently, the specific role Schopenhauer assigns to dialectic cannot be reported from the material at hand. The relevant Schopenhauer texts on dialectic are absent from the current memory.

Nietzsche attacks the moral elevation of pity. He calls pity (and the related “un‑egoistic” instincts of self‑denial and self‑sacrifice) a dangerous value that weakens humanity and pushes Western culture toward a nihilistic “nothingness.” He argues that this “pity‑morality” has been taken for granted without any critical examination, and that its unquestioned acceptance actually undermines life rather than promotes it.

I’m sorry, but the passages and concept cards in the current working memory do not contain any material on Schopenhauer’s doctrine of aesthetic contemplation or on the way that such contemplation is said to “suspend the will.” Without a relevant source I cannot provide a grounded answer. If you can supply the specific passage (or a summary that includes the key claim), I’ll be able to answer and cite it appropriately.

How Kant grounds the categorical imperative

1. Pure practical reason as the source of the law – Kant argues that the moral law must be derived from the faculty of reason itself, not from empirical inclinations. He writes that the “instrument” of cognition must first be examined before it is employed, and that the proper use of pure reason is to test maxims against the requirement of universal legislation .
2. The universal‑law test – The first formulation of the categorical imperative is the demand that a maxim be willed as a universal law. Kant states that an action is morally obligatory only when its maxim can be simultaneously willed to become a universal law without contradiction ; this is the “universalizability” test that grounds duty.
3. The second formulation (ends‑in‑themselves) – From the same rational basis Kant derives the requirement that rational beings be treated always as ends and never merely as means. He ties this to the autonomy of the will: because rational agents are legislators of universal law, they must respect each other’s rational nature .
4. Autonomy and dignity – Kant links the categorical imperative to the concept of freedom: a free will is a will that is a law to itself, i.e., it legislates universal law. The moral law therefore expresses the autonomy of rational agents, which gives them dignity .
5. Freedom as the condition of the moral law – The “concept of freedom” is the key that explains autonomy. Freedom is defined as the will’s capacity to be a law to itself, and this very capacity makes the categorical imperative possible ; the law is “categorical” because it is grounded in a law‑giving freedom that is not contingent on empirical conditions .
6. The impossibility of proving the imperative a priori – Kant admits that the supreme principle of morality (the categorical imperative) cannot be demonstrated by a further principle; its necessity is shown only by the “incomprehensibility” of any attempt to reduce it to an empirical motive .

Where Nietzsche would attack Kant’s move

1. Kant’s moral law as empty formalism – Nietzsche repeatedly characterises Kant’s moral system as a “logic of illusion” that cloaks ignorance with the form of rational law. In his critique of Kant’s “synthetic judgments a priori,” Nietzsche says that Kant’s answer to the problem of how such judgments are possible is merely a repetition of the question, offering no substantive grounding for the moral law .
2. The abstract, duty‑based ethic versus lived sympathy – Nietzsche contrasts Kant’s formal duty (the categorical imperative) with his own ethic of compassion. He argues that genuine virtue arises from felt sympathy, not from the abstract universalisation of maxims, and that Kant’s “pure” duty is an “empty formalism” that ignores the concrete motivations of human beings  (Schopenhauer’s passage is cited only to illustrate the broader critique of Kant’s abstractism; Nietzsche’s own summaries echo this point).
3. Kant’s “freedom” as a metaphysical fiction – Nietzsche doubts the legitimacy of Kant’s transcendental freedom that underwrites the categorical imperative. He sees the notion of a will that is “a law to itself” as a speculative construction that does not correspond to lived human experience, and therefore the moral law built on it is “a logic of illusion” rather than a genuine guide to action  (Kant’s own description of dialectic as illusion).
4. Moral law as a tool of power – In several of his passages Nietzsche claims that Kant’s universal law is a “law of illusion” that serves to impose a particular moral order without regard to the will to power that actually drives human behavior. He would therefore attack the categorical imperative as a “formal, sophistical art” that masks the underlying drives of self‑preservation and strength .

Summary

Kant grounds the categorical imperative in the structure of pure practical reason: a maxim must survive the universal‑law test, respect rational agents as ends, and rest on the autonomy that freedom provides. Nietzsche would strike at this grounding on three fronts: (i) he calls Kant’s a‑priori moral law a hollow formalism that offers no real content; (ii) he rejects the abstract duty‑based ethic in favor of a morality rooted in concrete sympathy and life‑affirming instincts; and (iii) he questions the metaphysical notion of freedom that Kant uses to make the imperative “categorical,” seeing it as a speculative illusion rather than a lived reality.